Browsing by Author "Onar, Erdal"
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Item 1982 Anayasası çerçevesinde Bakanlar Kurulu(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2012) Okşar, Mustafa; Onar, ErdalKuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesiyle temellendirilen demokratik hükümet sistemlerinin betimlenmesi, bağımsız olması gereken yargı erkini dışlayan, yasama ve yürütme kuvvetlerini esas alan bir düzlem üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Yasama ve yürütme kuvvetlerinin sistem içindeki konum ve etkinliği, hükümet sisteminin eksenini belirlemektedir. Anayasal tercih olarak soyut düzlemde kabul gören hükümet sistemleri, iktidar ve iktidar gücünün kullanımında etkin bir rol üstlenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, yürütme kuvveti, hükümet sistemlerinin özelliklerine bağlı olarak ülke yönetiminde merkezi bir role sahip bulunmaktadır. Günümüz anayasal demokrasilerinde, görev ve yetkileri artma eğilimi gösteren yürütme kuvvetinin, hükümet sistemi içindeki etkinliği ve sorumluluğu, diğer kuvvetlerle olan ilişkiler ağına bağlı olmakla birlikte; kendi yapısal iç ilişkileri açısından da yadsınamayacak bir önem göstermektedir. İki başlı yapısına bağlı olarak, siyasal sorumluluğu taşıyan Bakanlar Kurulunun, gerek Cumhurbaşkanı, gerek parlamento ile olan ilişkileri ve bunun yanında kendi iç yapısından kaynaklanan Başbakan-bakanlar arası ilişkileri, ayrı bir özellik ve önem taşımaktadır. Bu ilişkiler ağı, kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesi ve hükümet sistemleri bağlamında, birçok sorun ve tartışmayı gündeme getirmektedir. Bakanlar Kurulunun hükümet sistemlerine bağlı olarak konumu; hükümet sistemleri içinde kuvvetlerin karşılıklı ilişkilerinin uygulamadaki yansımaları; Bakanlar Kurulunun yürütmenin diğer organları ve parlamento ile olan ilişkileri; 1982 Anayasası çerçevesinde, çatışma, denge ve kaynaşmanın hangi yönde ilerlediği; soyut (anayasal) ve somut (uygulama) düzlemde Başbakan ve bakanlar arası ilişki ve etkileşimin kapsamı; Bakanlar Kurulunda, Başbakanın etkinliği ve gücünün nasıl bir gelişme ve değişme gösterdiği; Başbakanın, Bakanlar kurulu içindeki etkin konumu; 1982 Anayasası kapsamında, Bakanlar Kurulunun yapısı, işleyişi, görev ve yetkilerinin, ihtiyaçları ve siyasal gelişmeleri karşılayıp karşılayamadığı ve uygulamadaki etkinliği; güçlü bir yürütmenin gerekli olup olmadığı; güçlü bir yürütme içinde, Bakanlar Kurulunun işlevsel rolünün ne olduğu; 1982 Anayasasında Cumhurbaşkanının halk tarafından seçilmesi yönünde getirilen değişikliğin, yürütme organları üzerindeki olası etkileri ve getirilen bu yeni seçim esasının Bakanlar Kurulunun işlevselliği açısından bir etki yaratıp yaratmayacağı; Cumhurbaşkanı ile Bakanlar Kurulu ilişkisinin nasıl bir sapma veya etkileşim göstereceği gibi konuların tamamı, tartışmalı ve sorunlu alanları oluşturmaktadır. Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal gelişimi, hükümet sistemimizin, parlamenter hükümet sistemine doğru evrildiğini ve bu hükümet sisteminin kurumsallaştırılmasında önemli adımlar atıldığını göstermektedir. Nitekim, parlamenter hükümet sistemi gerçek yansımasını ilk olarak 1961 Anayasasında bulmuştur. 1982 Anayasasında öngörülen sistem, parlamenter hükümet sistemidir. Ancak içinde klasik parlamenter hükümet sisteminden farklı çizgiler barındıran 1982 Anayasasında, 21 Ekim 2007 tarihinde yapılan halk oylaması sonucu kabul edilen değişiklikle Cumhurbaşkanının halk tarafından seçilmesi esasının getirilmiş olması, Başbakan-Cumhurbaşkanı çatışması olasılığını artırıcı bir zemin hazırlamış olmakla birlikte; parlamenter hükümet sistemi betimlemesini de tartışmalı hale getirmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanının sahip olduğu yetkilere ilaveten halk tarafından seçilmenin getirdiği meşruiyet temelli güç katlanmasının, anayasal pratikler açısından güç ve etkinlik çatışmalarına yol açacağı tartışmasızdır. Gelecekteki nitelendirmeler, başkanlı parlamenter hükümet sistemini esas alan bir çerçeve üzerinden yapılacak değerlendirmeleri içerecektir. Cumhurbaşkanının sahip olduğu anayasal ve zorlayacağı siyasal yetkiler, Fransa örneğinde olduğu kadar yoğunluk göstermese de, potansiyel olarak işleyişi, yarı-başkanlık hükümet sistemi tanımlamasına taşıyabilecek nicelik ve niteliktedir. Bu bağlamda, uygulamalara bağlı nitelendirmelerin, başkanlı parlamenter ve yarı-başkanlık hükümet sistemleri arasında gidip gelen bir betimlemeyi kapsayacağını söylemek yanlış olmasa gerektir. Ancak bu aşamada, 1982 Anayasasındaki mevcut hükümet sisteminin, Cumhurbaşkanının halk tarafından seçilmesi durumunu da vurgulaması açısından, başkanlı parlamenter hükümet sistemi olarak nitelendirmek daha yerinde bir yaklaşım olacaktır. 1982 Anayasasının öngördüğü hükümet sisteminin uygulamadaki yansımalarının getirdiği kuvvetler arası ilişkilerde, Başbakan odaklı Bakanlar Kurulu, siyasal alt yapının açmış olduğu avantajlı yolda ilerleyerek, diğer siyasi organlar/aktörler ve özellikle yasama karşısında güçlü bir konuma gelmiş bulunmaktadır. Meclis çoğunluğuna üstün bir şekilde sahip olma durumu, bir tür iktidar partisi-Bakanlar Kurulu-Meclis özdeşleşmesi yolunu açmakta; bu düzlem üzerinden şekillenen ilişkiler dengesi, yasama karşısında geniş bir hareket serbestliğini elinde bulunduran hükümetin yasamaya karşı sorumluluğunu, uygulamada muhalefet - hükümet çatışmasına dönüştürmektedir. Parlamenter hükümet sistemi kapsamında kilit organı, Bakanlar Kurulu oluşturmaktadır. Gerçekte, Başbakan ve Bakanlar Kurulunun üyeleri arasındaki tek yönlü baskın ilişki, Başbakanı odak noktaya oturtmakta ise de, bu sistemin mantığı içinde temel eksen Bakanlar Kurulu üzerinden yapılandırılmak zorundadır. Ancak uygulama, gerek ülkemizde, gerek diğer ülkelerde farklı bir yönde ilerlemekte; Bakanlar Kurulu bütünü içinde Başbakan, farklı ve etkin bir noktaya çekilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, parlamenter hükümet sistemi içerisinde, birey bazında Başbakan, kurul bazında Bakanlar Kurulu egemen bir konuma sahip olmakta; diğer kuvvetler karşısında da siyasi parti disiplini, siyasi parti yapısı ve seçim sistemi gibi siyasal yapının gösterdiği özellikler sayesinde güçlü ve etkin bir rol üstlenebilmektedir.Abstract Defining democratic government system based on the principle of seperation of powers, stands upon a dimension within legislative and executive powers, excluding judiciary, which is to be independent. The power and stance of legislative and executive powers in a system determines the axis of system of government. The systems of government adopted on abstract bases as a constitutional preference, play a vital role in the exercise of power and power of ruling party. In today’s constitutional democracies within a government system, the influence and responsibility of executive power, which tends to increase its functions and authority, depends upon mutual relations with other powers, however, it is highly important within its structural internal relations. In accordance with its dual headed body, the Council of Ministers, with political liability, has important and distinct relations with both the President of the Republic and the Parliament, as well as relations between the Prime Minister and Ministers stemming from internal structure. This web of relations, raises many problems and debates in terms of seperation of powers and government systems. The position of the Council of Ministers depending on the systems of government; the practical implications of interrelations of powers within systems of government; relations between the Council of Ministers and other branches of executive, and the Parliament; within the 1982 Constitution, the way the debate, balance and interactions forward; the scope of relations and implications between the Prime Minister and Ministers on an abstract (constitutional) and concrete (practical) manner; the way power and influence of Prime Minister develop and change within the Council of Ministers, whether the body, function, duties, and authorities of Council of Ministers are eligible to satisfy political progress and its influence in practice from the aspect of 1982 Constitution, whether a powerful executive is required; what the functional role of Council of Ministers is within a powerful executive body; the probable implications of amendments to the 1982 Constitution regarding to the election of the President of the Republic by the voters, and whether this new election system will influence the functionality of Council of Ministers; how the interaction between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers will divert and influence, as a whole, are all problematic and open to discussion. The Ottoman-Turkish Constitutional progress indicates that our system of government evolves into a parliamentary government system and crucial steps have been taken towards the institutionalization of our system of government. As a result, parliamentary government system has found its real reflections within the 1961 Constitution. The system envisaged by the 1982 Constitution is parliamentary government system. Adopting the election process of the President of the Republic by the voters after the adoption of amendments to the 1982 Constitution following the election process of 21 October 2007 gave rise to the possibility of uncompromising between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic; it also made the concept of parliamentary government system disputable. In addition to the powers of the President of the Republic, the increase of powers based on the legitimacy stemming from election by the voters will give rise to disputes on power and influence in terms of Constitutional practice. Future determinations will include evaluations made on a framework based parliamentary with “president” system of government. Although the constitutional power and political stance of the President of the Republic is not intense as the one in French model, potential implementation will carry it to the semi-presidential system of government both in quality and quantity. In this respect, it is not incorrect to say that determinations based on practice will include descriptions between the parliamentary with “president” system of government and semi-presidential system of government. But at this stage, implying the election of the President of the Republic, it is better that the system of government mentioned in 1982 Constitution, will be described as parliamentary with “president” system of government. Within the relations between powers brought by the practical implications of the system of government envisaged in the 1982 Constitution, Prime Minister-focused- Council of Ministers advancing through the way opened by political sub-structure, has become powerful against other political bodies/actors, and specifying legislative. Having majority within the Parliament gives way to a kind of government party. Identical acceptance of Council of Ministers-Parliament, the balance of relations embodied in this dimension converts the liability of government against legislative, which has a great freedom against legislative, into a dispute between government and opposition. The key body within a parliamentary government system is the Council of Ministers. In reality, one sided superior relation between the Prime Minister and Members of the Council of Ministers, puts the Prime Minister at the focal point, however, the main axes within this system should be on the Council of Ministers. But the practice is different both in our courtry, and other countries. The Prime Minister within the Council of Ministers has evolved into a different and effective point. In this context, within the parliamentary government system, the Prime Minister, as individual capacity, and Council of Ministers, as a committee, will have sovereign position; they will also assume strong and influental roles because of the features of political structure, like political party discipline, political party structure, and election system, against other powers.Item 1982 Anayasası'nda seyahat özgürlüğü(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007) Aygün, Ercan; Onar, Erdal; Hukukin the first chapter, the historical progress of freedom of movement has been analyzed,in the second chapter, scope of freedom of movement has been examined,and also it has been mentioned that being a foreing had which effects on freedom of movement while entering and exiting the countryItem 1982 Anayasasında anayasayı değiştirme sorunu(Ankara : Ankara Üniversitesi, 1993) Onar, ErdalItem 1982 Anayasasında Cumhurbaşkanı(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2011) Özkul, Fatih; Onar, ErdalTEZ ÖZETİ Fatih Özkul, 1982 Anayasasında Cumhurbaşkanı, Doktora Tezi, Danışman: Prof. Dr. Erdal Onar, 271 s. Doktora tezinin konusu, 1982 Anayasasının hükümleri ışığında Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamının incelenmesidir. 1982 Anayasasında Cumhurbaşkanlığı sembolik bir makam olarak öngörülmemiştir. 1982 Anayasası, 1961 Anayasasına tepki olarak cumhurbaşkanına çok önemli görev ve yetkiler vermiştir. Bu görev ve yetkilerle cumhurbaşkanından en yüksek danışman ve politik krizlerde arabulucu bir hakem olması beklenmektedir. Türk Anayasal sisteminde Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamının büyük bir öneme sahip olmasından dolayı çalışmada, kurumu etkileyen tarihsel ve politik gelişmeler göz önüne alınmış, ilgili konularda önceki Anayasalarımızla ve gerekli görüldüğü takdirde yabancı anayasalarla karşılaştırmalar yapılmıştır. Çalışma şu şekilde üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır: a) Cumhurbaşkanının seçimi ve görev süresi, b) Cumhurbaşkanının görev ve yetkileri, c) Cumhurbaşkanının tarafsızlığı, sorumsuzluğu ve sorumluluğu. 2007 Anayasa değişikliği anayasal sistemimizde gerçekleştirilen en önemli değişikliktir. Bu değişiklikle birlikte artık cumhurbaşkanının halk tarafından seçilmesi, yedi yıl olan görev süresinin beş yıla indirilmesi ve bir kişinin en çok iki kez cumhurbaşkanı seçilebilmesi esası benimsenmiştir. Biz anılan değişikliğin, 1982 Anayasasının benimsediği parlamenter sistemi de değiştirdiğini düşünüyoruz. Tez çalışmasında Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamının 1982 Anayasasındaki düzenleniş şekli, uygulamada ortaya çıkan sorunlar, çözüm yolları ve 2007 Anayasa değişikliği karşısında hükümet sistemimiz etraflı bir şekilde incelenmiştir.ABSTRACT Fatih Özkul, The President of the Republic in the 1982 Constitution, Doctorate Thesis, Advisor: Prof. Dr. Erdal Onar, 271 p. The subject of the doctorate thesis is to examine the President of the Republic of Turkey under the light of the provisions of the 1982 Constitution. The President under the 1982 constitution is not a ceramonial leader. As a reaction to 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution gives very important functions and duties to the President. With his capacity and duties, he is expected to act a highest adviser and the persuasive arbiter in the times of the political crises. Since the Presidency as an institution has a great importance in Turkish Constitutional system, the historical and political developments that affected this institution is taken into account. The method carried out in this study, has been to examine the related subject by making comparisions with the previous constitutions and referances to the foreign constitutions if necessary. The study consists of the following main chapters: a) Elections and the term of the President, b) Duties and powers of the President, c) Impartiality, unresponsibility and responsibility of the President. The most important amendment made in our constitutional system is the 2007 amendment. From now on, the President of the Republic will be elected by the nation, the duty is declined to five years period and one can be elected maximum two times. I am of the opinion that with the 2007 amendment, the parliamentary system founded by the 1982 Constitution is also changed. In these thesis, the subject of the Presidency of the Republic, the problems in practises, solutions of the problems and the affect of the 2007 amendment on our government system is thorougly examined, under the provisions of the 1982 Constitution.Item 2001 Anayasa değişikliklerinin ışığında 1982 Anayasası'nda temel hak ve özgürlüklerin sınırlanması(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2005) Vuraldoğan, Kemal; Onar, Erdal; HukukItem Anayasa Mahkemesinin norm denetimi işlevi(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2009) Gültekin, Kazım; Onar, ErdalAnayasa Mahkemesinin Norm Denetimi İşlevi? adlı bu çalışmada, ?norm denetimi için Anayasa Mahkemesine başvuru yolları?, ?denetime tabi normlar?, ?ölçü normlar? ve ?norm denetiminin safhaları? dört bölüm halinde ele alınmıştır. Çalışmanın birinci bölümünde norm denetimi için Anayasa Mahkemesine başvuru yolları ele alınmış, bunlardan somut norm denetimi (defi yolu, itiraz yolu) ve soyut norm denetimi (dava yolu) Türkiye'deki gelişim ve uygulamalarıyla ele alınmış, anayasa şikayeti (bireysel başvuru üzerine denetim) ile ilgili olarak özellikle Türkiye'de uygulanması yönündeki tartışmalar ve dünyadaki uygulamaları üzerinde durulmuştur. İkinci bölümde, anayasal denetime tabi normlar; kanunlar, kanun hükmünde kararnameler, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İçtüzüğü, Anayasa değişiklikleri ve uluslararası andlaşmalar olarak Anayasa Mahkemesi uygulamaları incelenerek ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde, Anayasa Mahkemesinin yaptığı denetimde ölçü olarak kullandığı normlar; Anayasa kuralları yanında, uluslararası andlaşmalar ve uluslararası hukuk kuralları, hukukun genel ilkeleri, Atatürk ilke ve inkılâpları olarak ele alınmış, Anayasa Mahkemesinin kararları incelenerek bunların nasıl ve ne ölçüde, ölçü norm olarak kullanıldıkları incelenmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde, norm denetiminin safhaları; ilk inceleme, yürürlüğü durdurma ve sonuç bölümünde verilen kararlar olarak, iptal isteminin reddi, iptal kararı, konusu kalmayan istem hakkında karar verilmesine yer olmadığı kararı olarak ele alınmış, yine Anayasa Mahkemesinin kararları ele alınarak bu safhalar incelenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde ise çalışma boyunca incelenen kararlarla Anayasa Mahkemesinin norm denetimi işlevi değerlendirilmiş ve konuya ilişkin bir takım önerilere yer verilmiştir.Abstract In this study, name is ?The function of the norm review of The Constitutional Court?, there are four parts; ?remedies to The Constitutional Court for norm review?, ?audited norms?, ?reference norms? and the stages of norm review?. In first chapter, remedies to The Constitutional Court for norm review have been investigated; from these, concrete norm review (exception remedy) and abstract norm review (suit of nullity) have been handled with development and practices in Turkey, relating to the constitutional complaint (audit by individual application) has been dwelled upon especially the discussions of practicing in Turkey and practices in the World. In second chapter, constitutional audited norms; laws, law amending ordinances, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey İnternal Regulation, constitutional changes and international treaties have been handled in accordance with The Constitutional Court?s practices. In third cahapter, reference norms used by The Constitutional Court at time of review; in addition to constitutional rules, international treaties and international law rules, general principles of law, the principles and revolutions of Atatürk have been handled and The Constitutional Court?s decisions have been examined to find out how and to what degree used are these as reference norms. In fourth chapter, the stages of norm review; preliminary analysis, stop the enforcement and the decisions that given at conclusion part (rejection of annulment request, annulment decree, no need to adjudge because of subject of request is not to remain) have been handled, again these stages had been examined by considering the decisions of The Constitutional Court. In conclusion chapter, The Constitutional Court?s function of the norm review is evaluated in accordance with the decisions examined in the study and some recommendations are given.Item İki başlı yürütme yapılanması(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2002) Uluşahin, Fatma Nur; Onar, Erdal; HukukThis study is concerned with the effect of dual-executive bodies on democratic performance as a political institution. Dual executive bodies have two distinguishing features. The first defining criterion is that the government is depended on the confident of the assemly (except impeachment process); the second one is that the head of the state has quiet considerable powers competing those of the head of government. Dual executive bodies do not require the head of the slate is elected directly by the people. This is the point that differentiates the system from semi-presidential systems which had been defined by Duverger's innovative article in 1980. The reason for such a choice is that the conflict potential inherent to those systems comes from their two headed nature. Having a head of state elected by the assembly with quiet considerable powers competing those of the head of government, it does not necessarily have greater conflict potential when compared to another dual exucutive system having a head of state elected directly by the people but with only symbolic powers. Then, the point is not the direct election criterion but competing powers. And in a group of political systems the potential of conflict is greater than all others. The systems which give the president the powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet which will be depended to parliamentary confidence are called unipolar-dual executive bodies. The reason for that naming is that in these systems the president is the only pole of the system considering his other appointment powers, legislative powers (that enables him to by pass the parliament), executive powers and so on. Weimar Republic (1919-1933), Sri Lanka, Portugal (1976-1982), Russia Federation(1993) are the examples of unipolar-dual executive bodies. The other group of dual executive bodies which we call as pure ones do not give the president the power to say last word on the formation of the cabinet. Yet the systems giving quite considerable powers to presidents differs in practice as government-dominant forms, president-dominant forms and which the dominant form is indefinite or unfixed. We examined Austria, Iceland, Ireland and Bulgaria as examples of government-dominant forms, Finland and France as examples of un fixed/indefinite-dominant forms and we yet could not se an example of president-dominated dual executive body. We concluded that the government-dominant forms practicing the parliamentary rule are only seemingly dual-executive while the others are real dual-executive. In result, we can say that our thesis relating that the main defining criterion is not direct election of the president but competing power in both parts of the executive is proved to be true. 220Item Karşılaştırmalı Hukukta ve Türkiye'de devlet başkanının veto yetkisi(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007) Bahçeci, Barış; Onar, Erdal; HukukThe presidential veto power has different functions at different governmental systems. According to the conditions of the legislature or the political parties, even the practices may differ from one state to other which practice the same governmental system. In this study, firstly, these differences are examined and the veto power is discussed in a comparative perspective. Then, the debate about the utilization of this power in Turkey is overviewed. It is aimed to point out how, under which conditions and with which purposes the presidents use this power in Turkey. Finally, some propositions which can help to surmount the problems emerging from the utilization of the veto power are made.Item Kişi hak ve hürriyetlerinde devletin pozitif yükümlülüğü(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007) Şen, Murat; Onar, Erdal; HukukAs long as the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are concerned, it had been thought for a long time that the state always had a ?negative? (namely, avoiding from intervening in, stepping in) obligation and such attitude had been affirmed. In this scope, the state would respect the individual?s rights and freedoms and it would stick to its constitutional commitment of not intervening therein. This classic and dominant comprehension has been radically changed by means of ?Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of European Union?, which moved ?protection? to the international law domain. European Court of Human Rights made some decisions to the effect that the states do not only have a negative obligation, but also positive obligations in implementing the Convention for ensuring the effective use of the rights of the individual. In this regard and for the proper protection of the human rights, the designation of the scope of the positive obligations of the state in the negative status rights, provided under the title of Rights and the Freedoms of the Individual of 1982 Constitution arises as an important issue. Even the concept of the positive obligation isn?t sufficient to explain its scope; it is likely to define it in the context of negative status rights. The scope of the positive obligation is tried to be defined below with the examination of certain negative status rights.Item Meclis araştırması(Ankara : Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1977) Onar, ErdalItem Türk Anayasasında bütçe ve kesin hesap Kanunları(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007) Kara, Seyfettin; Onar, Erdal; HukukThe subject of this thesis is the Budget Law and the Law of Final Accounts in the Turkish Constitution. The thesis is composed of five main sections including introduction and conclusion. Introduction includes the explanation of the subject and the methodology of the thesis. In the first section, the concept of budget; it?s political, economic and legal function as well as its historical development throughout world history, Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic are thoroughly examined. In the second section, categories and principles of budget, and budget systems are described. The third section which is titled contemporary budget system is reserved to explain legal basis of budget, its preparation, ratification, implementation and auditing processes as well as judicial review of the constitutionality of the budget law within the framework of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Law of Final Accounts are also examined in detail in the section of Budget Audit. The conclusion and evaluation section deals with the necessity of the state?s role in making the budget for balancing the needs of the society with the limited resources, in this respect, budget?s legal character and it?s difference from other laws are defined. Furthermore in this section, legislative body?s implementation and the auditing role of the budget which is performed by Final Account Laws are explained. The thesis concluded with the right of the Constitutional court to repeal the irrelevant articles of the budget law.Item Türk Parlamento Hukukunun kaynakları ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin çalışma düzeni(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008) Has, Volkan; Onar, Erdal; Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu YönetimiIn this study, the practices of the Turkish Parliamentary law and the customs appearing subject to this law, has been handled in terms of the procedural discussions, the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the point of views claimed in the doctrine and our personal opinions.It can be seen in this study that the practices of the Turkish Parliamentary law and the customs appearing subject to that law may be the reason and the source of the existence of the many internal regulation rules. But the restriction of the controlling power of the Constitutional Court may lead to a negligence of attention in waivering the past practices with the grounds of interest and so that resulting in the lack of enabling the stability. Nevertheless, this situation hinders the development of the Turkish Parliamentary law which can flourish through the decision determined by the Constitutional Court.The aid of the the Judicial control to the development of Turkish Parliamentary law is not only restricted with the formation of the the customs. However, the decisions of the Constitutional Court determined before, may lead to formation or change not only in the customs but also in the formal regulations law. In our study, it can particularly be seen that the decisions made by the Constitutional Court during the effectiveness of the Constitution of 1961, has reshaped the rules of the internal regulation.In comparison with the Constitutional period of 1961, there has been observed a more positive approach than that of the 1982 . As a result of that approach, there has been a rise in the number of the published books pertaining to the Turkish Parliamentary law in the recent periods. The rise of interest among the academic people and the publishing of more books concerning the subject, provides us with the assessing of Turkish Parliamentary law practices in terms of lawfulness and develops the formation of a criticizing point of view which has an affect on modifying and evolving the practices through lawfulness.Item Yasama meclisi içtüzüğü (hukuki niteliği ve yargısal denetimi)(Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2006) Alp Arslan, Gündüz; Onar, Erdal; HukukSUMMARYParliaments are one of the indispensible institutions of modern democracies.Boards which comprise representatives of communities have got the power tolegislate at the end of relatively long process. Standing Orders that is the subject ofour thesis are the texts which comprise the rules how the parliaments works. Mainaim of our thesis is to clarify the juridical character of standing orders of theparliament. In order to clarify the juridical character of standing orders, firstly thelegislative function and acts are defined. By this way, the position of standing ordersthrough the legislative acts is fixed. As the parliaments continue to make progress,the standing orders are also continue to develop. So that, our thesis include thehistorical evolution of the standing orders in Ottoman-Turkish parliamentarism.Standing orders have two meaning which are narrow and wide. The narrowmeaning of standing orders is the text of a systematic order. The wide meaning ofstanding orders contains various types of legal texts about how parliament works,decisions of courts and the traditions which occasionally take place in practice withthe narrow meaning of standing orders. Standings orders are one of the parliamentacts that is under the control of Constitutional Court. The reason of this control is toprevent standing orders of the parliament to become a dictatorial gun in the hands ofmajority. Consequently, we analyze the decisions of Constitutional Court regardingstanding orders in our thesis.The most important conclusion of this thesis is every recently electedparliament have the right to make its own standing orders. Another conclusion is thatStanding Orders must be a formal parliament order. The last conclusion is thatprovisions which binds and obligates citizens cannot be regulated by Standing Orderswhich must include provisions about the process of parliament.Item Yavuz Sabuncu’yu anarkenOnar, Erdal